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Urging Righteousness and Virtue: Socrates, 
Gorgias and the Nature of Moral Argument
Peter G. Woolcock
In the Gorgias Socrates claims that it is worse to be a wrong-doer than to be the victim of 
wrong-doing. His adversaries, Polus and Callicles, regard this position as preposterous. 
In this paper, I argue that, from the viewpoint of what it is rational to urge others to do, 
then Polus and Callicles are the ones acting irrationally, at least when the urging takes 
place in a consensual, as opposed to a coercive, argument situation between autonomous 
and competent rational agents. They are guilty of a pragmatic practical paradox, even if 
what they say may be rational enough to believe when held as a theoretical view about 
a third party. My analysis also demonstrates that rationality favours the urging of most 
of the other startling judgements that Socrates endorses, with particular consideration 
given to the centrality of shame in showing the irrationality of urging some courses of 
action rather than others. 
Introduction
In the Gorgias Socrates makes a series of assertions that strike his listeners Polus 
and Callicles as absurd, at least initially, and strike many of us today the same way. 
The man who inflicts evil, Socrates claims, is necessarily more unhappy than the 
man who is the innocent victim of evil (475e). The wicked man is unhappy, but the 
unhappiest man of all is the wicked man who does not meet with justice, rebuke 
and punishment (472e). Tyrants like the Macedonian dictator Archelaus who can 
kill whomever they please and inflict confiscation and banishment on anyone they 
choose are the least powerful persons in a state (466). Anyone who has done wrong 
will only be happy if he denounces himself and cheerfully offers himself for whatever 
punishment his crime deserves. If his friends or family do wrong, he will not be 
happy unless he is the first to accuse them (480). To cap off this list of remarkable 
assertions, Socrates claims that, if our enemy “has stolen a lot of money he must 
not pay it back, but keep it and spend it on himself and his family without regard 
to God or man; if he has committed crimes for which the penalty is death he must 
not be executed. The most desirable thing would be that he should never die, but 
Woolcock, P.G., 2013. Urging righteousness and virtue: Socrates, Gorgias and the nature of moral argument. 
Journal of Modern Greek Studies (Australia and New Zealand) - Special Issue, 16-25.  
Published version of the paper reproduced here with permission from the publisher.
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
SocrateS, GorGiaS and the nature of Moral arGuMent
17
live forever in an immortality of crime; the next best that he should live as long as 
possible in that condition” (480–1).
In this paper I intend to use the debate in the Gorgias to raise, and investigate, 
some puzzles about the rationality of moral argument. Is it a rational enterprise? If 
so, what is its point? Argument about what I will call “descriptive” matters, such as 
scientific and historical arguments, seem to be rational in that they are an effective 
means for achieving the purpose we have in mind in pursuing them, namely, arriving 
at the truth of the matter. This is so because there actually are truths in these fields to 
be discovered, and arguing does seem to increase the likelihood of true answers. Does 
moral argument have the same rational point, or would there still be rational point to 
it, even if there were no descriptive moral truths? It is the principal aim of this paper 
to show that moral argument would have rational point regardless.
I will say that people act rationally when they are not acting in a self-defeating 
manner, that is, they do the thing they believe is the most effective means for achiev-
ing the purpose they have in mind, on the assumption that this is not incompatible 
with some other purpose that matters more to them. Were it to be so, then they would 
act in accord with the more important purpose. Agents will be considered irrational 
when they knowingly act in a self-defeating manner. 
Whether or not it is rational to engage in argument about a particular practical 
matter depends on a number of factors. One such factor is the nature of the agents 
engaged in the argument. I will assume that the parties to the argument are what I will 
call “autonomous” and “competent” (Rawls, 2001:18–24). They are autonomous in the 
sense that they conceive of themselves as ends in themselves, not mere instruments 
for the achievement of the goals and purposes of other agents but self-authenticating 
initiators of goals and purposes of their own. Further, they conceive of themselves 
as independent of any particular goals they might come to adopt, capable of revising 
and changing their goals in the light of new information 
They are competent in the sense that they possess the capacities necessary to engage 
meaningfully in argument, both in terms of acquiring and evaluating information 
and in terms of acting consistently with any conclusions reached as a consequence 
of the argument. While the parties in the Gorgias regard each other as mistaken in 
certain respects none of them seems to doubt that all of them are autonomous and 
competent in the way just described. In fact, it is precisely because they do regard 
each other as autonomous and competent that they regard the enterprise of argument 
as worth the effort.1 
A second factor to be taken into account is the kind of situation in which the par-
ties find themselves. Two kinds of argument situations are of particular interest. A 
“consensual argument situation” is one where the parties lack the power to force their 
1 For a useful discussion of Socrates’ dialectical method, in which an alternative justification from my 
“urging” account is offered for the seeming simple-mindedness of Socrates’ opponents and the seeming 
sophistical nature of his arguments, see Krook, 1959. Also see Dilman, 1979, where Socrates’ arguments 
in the Gorgias are given a Wittgensteinian interpretation.
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opponents to say that they agree with them. In effect, they are in a position of more or 
less equal power with respect to each other. If everyone does come to an agreement 
then this is not because they have been intimidated or threatened into agreeing but 
because they have freely and willingly endorsed the agreed-upon conclusion of their 
own accord as a result of the argument put to them. A “coercive argument situation” 
is, by contrast, has, as its major premise, the conditional “If you don’t do what I tell 
you, then you will be punished”. 
When an argument is conducted in a consensual argument situation between 
parties who regard each other as equally ends in themselves then, I suggest, they will 
largely agree on what it is rational for them to endorse in how they are to treat each 
other. Socrates, as he says, prefers to engage in an argument on a one-to-one basis 
(474) but the conditions of the consensual argument situation are such that it does 
not matter who the particular individuals are that participate in the argument. These 
conditions will push them into agreeing on a common body of judgements about 
character and action that it is rational to endorse publicly.
Power and happiness
Let us return, then, to the assertions that Polus makes about what kind of life people 
must lead if they are to be happy. “To listen to you, Socrates,” he says, “one might 
think that you wouldn’t be glad to have the opportunity of doing what you please in 
the state rather than not, and that you don’t envy a man who can kill or confiscate or 
imprison at will.” Socrates asks, “Justly or unjustly, do you mean?” Polus replies, “It 
makes no difference; he’s enviable in either case, isn’t he?” (469). 
There are at least two things that the parties to this argument could be using the 
argument to achieve. On the one hand, they could be using the argument to settle the 
descriptive question of whether or not a person maximises their chance of happiness 
by maximising their power. On the other hand, they could be using the argument to 
influence the other to adopt a particular attitude to the use of power in the pursuit of 
happiness, that is, they could be using the argument to achieve a prescriptive, rather 
than a descriptive purpose. All of the parties in the Gorgias believe that a rational 
agent will want to maximise his own happiness. Polus believes this of Socrates. Polus, it 
seems, is involved in a pragmatic practical paradox in seeking to convince Socrates of 
the truth of the descriptive proposition that maximising an agent’s happiness requires 
maximising that agent’s power. Polus wants to be free to do whatever he pleases, 
including killing people and confiscating their property, but he knows that Socrates, 
as an autonomous rational agent, will not want Polus to be free in this way, and yet 
he reveals to Socrates that this is what he, Polus, wants, when he must know that the 
inevitable effect of his letting Socrates know this is that Socrates will be better placed 
by this knowledge to prevent Polus doing whatever he pleases.
If Polus is not to engage in this kind of self-defeating behavior, then he can-
not argue in a way that reveals that he is the kind of egoist that he actually is. In 
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a consensual practical argument situation, both he and Socrates will have to argue 
on the assumption that each of them is an autonomous rational agent of equal worth, 
equally deserving of being treated as ends in themselves. He will have to argue as if 
he accepts that Socrates’ concerns are to be given equal weight with his own, that he 
wants them to get equal consideration with his own. In publicly defending the view 
he does, then, he has acted irrationally. 
However, had Polus kept the debate at the purely descriptive level rather than 
indicating his belief that the rational thing for him or Socrates to do was to act 
unjustly if they had the same power as Archelaus, if he had merely kept the discus-
sion in the third person, using Archelaus as a theoretical case as opposed to one to 
be followed, then he would not have acted irrationally. For this to be clear, however, 
the discussion would need to have been conducted in a context where it was under-
stood that the arguments offered were meant to explore what might be true, not to 
indicate where the speaker’s individual value commitments lay. In other words it 
needed to be the context of a purely philosophical debate in which the cases were 
discussed in the third person, not in the first or second person, as if they were about 
how third parties might act, not how Socrates and Polus themselves would act. The 
purely philosophical question is whether or not it is ever rational for people to use 
power unjustly as a means to achieving their own happiness. Socrates, however, is 
concerned with the practical question of whether or not one ought to be the kind 
of person who would endorse this as the rational thing to do, which people would 
only do if they had the kind of values that made it rational from their point of 
view. Socrates makes it very clear that this is his enterprise in his closing remarks 
to Callicles where he explicitly urges Callicles to follow a life of righteousness and 
virtue. He says, “Let us follow that way and urge others to follow it, instead of the 
way which you in mistaken confidence are urging upon me; it is quite worthless, 
Callicles” (527).
Punishment and happiness
What, then, of claims about who is the happiest — the man who commits evil and 
gets away with it, or the man who commits evil and is justly punished? Interestingly, 
Socrates has an unexpected modern ally on this topic. Osama bin Laden once said, 
“If a man is a real Muslim and commits a crime, he can only be happy if he is justly 
punished” (Fisk, 2005:24).
For our purposes, the crux of the matter is not whether the man who commits 
evil and gets away with it is happier than the man who commits evil and is justly 
punished. Rather, the issue is which of these two alternatives is it rational for a man to 
publicly endorse in an argument? The wrong answer will lead his listeners to conclude 
that argument with him is a waste of time, showing him to be the kind of person 
who would have no intention of abiding by any agreement they reached anyway. 
Suppose Polus says to Socrates, “Yes, I am the sort of person who would be happier 
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committing evil and getting away with it than I would be if I committed evil and 
were justly punished”. What kind of sense is he hoping Socrates will make of that? 
Assume that Polus says what he does because he thinks it will serve his own ends. 
What end could Polus have in mind in letting Socrates know that he would be hap-
pier committing evil and getting away with it than he would be committing evil and 
being justly punished for it? There might, by contrast, be some point to his telling 
Socrates that he sought punishment for his evil acts. In a situation where he cannot 
force Socrates to behave one way rather than the other, it might have the effect of 
getting Socrates to believe that Polus is truly repentant and, therefore, unlikely, or 
less likely, to perform future evil acts. Of course, he may not be telling the truth but, 
whether true or not, it might get Socrates to cooperate with him in ways useful for 
the furthering of Polus’s own ends. 
However, to tell Socrates that he is the kind of person who would not be happy to 
be justly punished for having committed evil is to admit that the evil he commits is 
deliberate and intentional and likely to be repeated, and shows that he is unrepentant, 
whereas an active desire to be punished indicates that he did not intend the act, that 
it was due to weakness of will or a misunderstanding of the situation or whatever and 
that he wishes to offer redress for the harm he has caused. On the assumption, then, 
that Polus does not want to give other people reasons to limit his freedom to live his 
life as much as possible in accordance with his own preferences, he will not admit (in 
a consensual argument situation) to being the kind of person who would be happy to 
do evil and escape punishment.
In fact, he would want others to think that he was the kind of person who would 
regard a fall into temptation as a form of corruption of his soul, as a rottenness in his 
spirit on a par with leprosy in the body, something deserving the spiritual equivalent 
of being cauterised out or surgically removed, just as Socrates describes it. Again, it 
would be a pragmatic paradox not to do so. It is a contradiction in the sense that, with 
respect to his own ends, a failure to publicly declare his own evil-doing as corrupting 
is something he recognises would subvert his ends. In other words, such a failure to 
do so would be self-defeating.
We may even have an explanation here for why Socrates thinks people only com-
mit evil acts out of ignorance. One way in which others may come to accept that you 
are not an evil person at heart is for them to believe that you were ignorant that what 
you were doing was wrong but that, now you realise it, you will ensure that you do 
not repeat the behaviour, that you are aghast at what you have done and ashamed not 
to have understood its nature.
Inflicting evil to avoid evil
What about the case where Polus is confronted with a choice between doing evil to 
others or suffering it himself? He sees them both as bad options but, if he had to make 
a choice, he would choose what he sees as the least bad option for himself, namely 
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to do evil to others.2 Would it be rational of him to let other people such as Socrates 
know this about himself? 
Suppose, for example, a vicious tyrant told Polus he could choose between kill-
ing another person or having his own big toe cut off (to modify an example from 
Parfit, 2011:207). Unless Polus had a fanatical commitment to honesty, it would be 
self-defeating of Polus to say to anyone who could be that other person that, were 
such a situation to arise, he would choose to save his own big toe. Such a revelation 
would ensure that those other people never knowingly placed themselves in a situ-
ation where their welfare depended on Polus putting himself even at a minor risk. 
As a consequence, given that it is highly likely that some of the most important of 
Polus’ goals will depend on other people placing themselves in such a situation, then 
Polus’ honesty would have guaranteed that these goals would not be met. It would 
be a practical paradox to make public that one was the kind of person who valued 
himself so highly in comparison to others that he would do a major evil to others to 
avoid a minor evil to himself. 
To avoid this paradox, Polus would need to give others the impression that he and 
they were of equal value. As such, he can admit that he would save his own life in 
preference to the life of another because his life has the same value as that of the other, 
but only if he could do so by fair means. He could admit, for example, that he would 
swim as fast as he could to be the first person to the only lifebuoy in a shipwreck but 
not that, were someone else to beat him to the lifebuoy, that he would pull out a knife 
and stab that person to death. This would be to reveal that his claims to regard other 
people as of equal worth with himself were entirely insincere. By contrast, were he 
to declare that he would intentionally let someone else (his wife, say) beat him to the 
lifebuoy because he valued that person more than himself, this would not generate 
a practical paradox. 
Corruption and happiness
This brings us to the most outrageous of Socrates’ claims, namely, his claim that, 
when an enemy of ours injures a third party, we should connive with that enemy to 
ensure that he avoids punishment, helping him to live a long life in the unhindered 
enjoyment of his ill-gotten gains. What Socrates is getting at here is that he, himself, 
is the kind of person who would find the corruption of the soul that the evil-doer 
undergoes as far worse than being punished and redeemed, even if the punishment 
was death, that he sees the punishment as the cure for a bad condition. What we have 
here is a particular use of the word “real” or “really”. The really moral man, the one 
that it is in Polus’s interests as a rational agent to give the impression to other people 
that he is, is a man who would be made totally miserable by not redeeming himself. 
It would be a worse punishment to him than the cleansing punishment of justice. 
2 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting further discussion of this issue.
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Osama bin Laden uses the word “real” in his term “real Muslim” in exactly the same 
way. What end of Polus’s would be served by his saying to Socrates that he would not 
be miserable in this way, that he would, in fact, revel in the opportunity to enjoy his 
ill-gotten gains forever? In a situation where he has more or less equal power with 
Socrates, where he will often need Socrates’ cooperation or, at least, not his active 
hostility, it would be counter-productive of him to cause Socrates to think he was 
an unscrupulous and ruthless exploiter of others who would not be ashamed of the 
harm he caused them. His interests would be best served by convincing Socrates that 
he was a truly moral person, and one step towards convincing Socrates of this would 
be to say that he regarded the corruption of his soul as a worse punishment than any 
he could be justly dealt, no matter how serious, even death.
It should be noted, however, that, while this is what it is rational for him to say 
about himself, if he is to avoid being seen as an egoist, he does not need to draw the 
more extreme conclusion that Socrates does, nor does rationality require him to 
believe what he says. Moreover, he can admit that it is a descriptive truth that there 
are people whose happiness is in no way diminished by the evil of their acts and the 
corruption of their moral nature. No obvious irrationality is involved in his admitting 
that not everybody is a true moral agent like Socrates and himself. Consequently, he 
can reject as a travesty of justice Socrates’ proposal that our enemy is most effectively 
punished merely by allowing the malignancy in his soul free rein. 
Now, this proposal of Socrates makes sense if we accept his controversial view that 
people only commit evil acts out of ignorance. It certainly would be rational to say 
to someone who accused you of an undeniable crime that you did not realise at the 
time the wrongness of what you were doing. This indicates a current recognition of its 
wrongness and implies a resolution not to repeat it now that you know it is wrong. As 
such, it reassures your listeners about your status as a moral agent. However, rational-
ity does not require you to agree that all other people who act wrongly have done so 
out of ignorance. Once again, there is an important difference between, on the one 
hand, what actions, performed either by yourself or other people, it is rational for 
you to prescribe publicly and, on the other hand, what it is rational for you to offer 
as a description of what other people endorse without thereby endorsing it yourself.
Gorgias and shame
An emotion that plays an especially important role in the Gorgias is shame (Tarnopo-
lsky, 2010). As it happens, much of what is explained in terms of shame in the Gorgias 
can be seen as an outcome of the kind of rational restrictions on what one can say 
that I have highlighted in this paper.
Consider the case of Gorgias himself. Socrates’ discussion with Gorgias is a pre-
liminary to his argument with Polus about when a person can properly be said to have 
power. Gorgias, in effect, is boasting that oratory is a good thing because the orator 
is a man with a particularly useful kind of power, namely, the power to bend people 
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to his will with his oratory. Saying that it is a good thing amounts to saying that it is 
something you endorse, that you would pursue. However, it is not a rational move to 
announce to people on whom you might use this power that you endorse your using 
it in a way that is indifferent to its effects on them, that you think exploiting them in 
this way would be a good thing. Socrates picks up on this, getting Gorgias to admit 
that he would only use his power of oratory for morally acceptable purposes. Socrates 
plays on the fact that Gorgias would be ashamed to have people think that he would 
exploit them for his own selfish advantage. To avoid this shame, Gorgias finds himself, 
in effect, admitting that oratory gives the orator a power that, as a good man, he will 
rarely use. In fact, Socrates can only think of one use for it, and that is the bizarre case 
we came across earlier, of persuading people not to bring their enemies to justice.
By the end of the argument, his rationality requires Gorgias to say, even if he doesn’t 
believe it, that the power he attributes to oratory is one that he will rarely use, and a 
power that is rarely used hardly counts as a power at all. For all practical purposes, 
Socrates’ argument has led Gorgias to withdraw his original assertion. However, this 
withdrawal should not be seen as a demonstration by Socrates that oratory does not 
possess the power that Gorgias first claimed it had. Clearly it does, if all that is taken 
into consideration is a purely descriptive account of power. Instead, what Socrates has 
done is to get Gorgias to withdraw his initial endorsement of this power, his conten-
tion that it was a good thing. But just because a particular power is not a good thing, 
it doesn’t follow that it stops being a power, although Socrates often seems to think 
that this kind of conclusion does follow.
Callicles and pleasure
What, then, of Callicles? Callicles thinks that happiness is constituted by luxury and 
excess and licence. In order to be happy, therefore, to live as he ought, “a man should 
encourage his appetites to be as strong as possible instead of repressing them, and by 
means of his courage and intelligence to satisfy them in all their intensity by providing 
them with whatever they happen to desire” (492). As we noted earlier, all the parties in 
the Gorgias see his own personal happiness as the rational thing for a man to pursue. 
As a consequence, they regard happiness as the good, where the good is that which 
they would endorse as worthy of pursuit. So, if the happy life is the life of pleasure, 
and Callicles says that happiness is the good, then Callicles is committed to endors-
ing any form of life that gives the person who lives it a maximum indulgence in what 
they enjoy. As Socrates cunningly reveals, Callicles is not prepared to do anything of 
the kind. Socrates says to him, “Take the life of a catamite; is not that dreadful and 
shameful and wretched? Or will you dare say that such people are happy provided that 
they have an abundant supply of what they want?” Callicles’s response clearly indicates 
that he regards the life of a catamite as shameful and not something he thinks is to 
be pursued or endorsed i.e. good. None of this shows that, at the purely descriptive 
level, the life of a catamite cannot be a happy one but Socrates is not operating at the 
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descriptive level. For him, and for Callicles, a speaker should not say that a life is a 
happy one unless he would regard it as a good one, and he should not regard it as a 
good one unless he can endorse it and commend its pursuit. Callicles cannot com-
mend the pursuit of the way of life of a catamite because he finds it a shameful life 
so he is pushed into agreeing with Socrates that it is not the case that all pleasures, 
regardless of their nature, are good.
Even if he hadn’t regarded the life of a catamite as shameful, Callicles is in trouble 
trying to convince his listeners that there is no distinction between good and bad 
pleasures. Why would it be rational of Socrates, or anyone else, to accept that a way 
of life that took pleasure in their pain, or that could only prosper by the thwarting of 
their goals or purposes, was one that they should endorse?
Conclusion
What we have seen in our discussion of the Gorgias is that rational, autonomous, 
competent agents will find it rational to publicly endorse certain kinds of action and 
character when they engage in argument in a consensual argument situation. It seems 
that this would still be so even if there were no descriptive moral truths, for example, 
even if no error was involved in not believing that people were equally valuable as 
ends in themselves. Socrates himself seems to recognise the limits of what argument 
alone can achieve when he resorts to the myths of the leaky soul (493) and the naked 
judgement (523) to make the moral life as attractive as possible. In the situation of 
a tyrant like Archelaus and his subjects, what it will be rational for those with supe-
rior power to say publicly will differ from what it is rational for those with inferior 
power to say. Unlike scientific or historical truths, truths about what it is rational to 
endorse are relative to the powers of the parties engaged in the argument, as well as 
to the values that motivate them. Rationality in itself does not seem to require us to 
value other rational, autonomous, competent agents, including ourselves, as equally 
worthwhile ends in themselves. However, for those of us who see each other as par-
ties to a consensual argument situation (and I assume that this includes you and me) 
then it would be a pragmatic practical paradox for any of us to tell the others that 
we do not consider them equally worthwhile ends in themselves. If this so, then, as I 
believe I have shown, we will also endorse almost all of the conclusions that Socrates 
urges upon us in the Gorgias. 
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